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Allowing Intervention By Non-Settling
PRPS: Not the "Environmentally
Correct" Decision, But One that is
Unavoidable
JOSEPH F. MAHONEY*
I. Introduction
The first Earth Day in April of 1970 marked the begin-
ning of environmental awareness in the United States.' The
reality that the Earth was headed for an environmental dis-
aster of incomprehensible proportions could no longer be ig-
nored. 2 The social conscience of the United States, as
demonstrated by the historic Earth Day celebration, began to
examine the environmental issues facing the country and cre-
ate solutions designed to address those issues.3 In other
words, society realized that it was time to reevaluate its out-
look toward the environment and take steps to revamp the
"primitive environmental law[s]"4 which had then existed.5
As society has advanced, industrial knowledge and tech-
nology has developed in stride. Concurrently, environmental
problems which had not been foreseen had to be addressed
and dealt with in some fashion. Chemical, nuclear, hazard-
ous, and radioactive wastes are prime examples, albeit not
exclusive ones, of environmental problems facing our society
* B.A., 1994, State University of New York, College at New Paltz; J.D.,
1997, Pace University School of Law. The author would like to thank his sister
Tracy, his mother and his father for their continuing and undying support and
assistance throughout the pursuit of his education.
1. Marty M. Judge et al, History of Environmental Problems, in 1 ENvI-
RONMENTAL DisPuTE HANDBOOK: LIABILITY AND CLAIMS 5 (David A. Carpenter et
al. eds., 1991).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 7.
5. See id.
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due to its development. These problems also represent the
fact that society is trading technological advancement for the
degradation of the environment, a bargain that Professor Al-
vin Weinberg has called a Faustian pact.6 To ensure that our
environmental Faustian bargain mirrors the outcome of the
literary work, society must learn to responsibly deal with the
consequences that are derived from the benefits of technologi-
cal advancement.7
One particular statute enacted to deal with such conse-
quences is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).8 CERCLA ad-
dresses the cleanup of existing hazardous waste sites located
throughout the country.9 Under CERCLA, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA), after using government money
to cleanup a hazardous waste site, is authorized to enter into
an agreement either to (1) finance the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites10 or (2) limit the liability of certain persons or or-
ganizations that may be responsible for the damage at the
hazardous waste site." These agreements, referred to as
6. See WARREN FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILTY 75 (1992) (refer-
ring to Goethe's Faust, where Faust, the protagonist made a deal with the devil.
Faust would receive success and fame in his life, but would have to exchange
his soul for these benefits. The culmination of the play is Faust's attempt to try
to renege on his deal with the devil and save his soul. Similarly, our society has
accepted the benefits that the advancement of technology has given us, but the
trade off has been the partial degradation of the environment. The bargain
made by society is compared to Faust's bargain because both traded something
precious for an immediate short term gain, and like Faust, society is attempting
to avoid the consequences of its actions).
7. See id.
8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
9. See CERCLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (referring to the duties of the
Administrator of the EPA to: (1) create regulations indicating what substances
are to be classified as hazardous substances, to specifically focus upon those
which are substantially dangerous to the health or welfare of humans or the
environment; (2) create regulations concerning the quantity of hazardous sub-
stances necessary for CERCLA to be utilized).
10. See CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a).
11. See CERCLA § 122(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c)(1) (stating that the agree-
ment entered into by the potentially responsible parties (PRPs) and the United
States is the mechanism for determining the liability of the settling PRP(s)).
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consent decrees, 12 generally contain a provision that protects
the signing polluter from any and all contribution claims
brought by a non-settling party 13 using its statutorily
granted right of contribution as a basis for the claim. 14 This
Comment addresses whether a non-settling party can suc-
cessfully move to intervene in a consent decree, which EPA is
attempting to enter in a federal district court, in order to pro-
tect the statutorily granted right of contribution.
The courts are split as to whether a non-settling party is
legally allowed to intervene in this type of circumstance. 15
One line of reasoning holds that a non-settling party may not
intervene because such an action would interfere with con-
gressional intent.16 Conversely, the other line of reasoning
holds that a non-settling party may intervene to protect its
claim of contribution. 17 This line of decisions has evolved
from an examination of the statute, a reading of its plain and
unambiguous language, a following of applicable rules from
other areas of law, and a commitment towards enforcing the
law that Congress has created.
Part II of this Comment explains the basic background of
CERCLA, its terminology, its purpose, how it works, and the
provisions regarding intervention and contribution. Part III
examines United States v. Union Electric,'8 a leading case re-
cently decided by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
held that a party may intervene to protect a contribution
claim. Part III will also discuss United States v. Alcan Alu-
minum, Inc.,19 a leading case decided by the Third Circuit
12. See CERCLA § 122(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A).
13. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (stating that those PRPs
who have "resolved" their liability with the federal or state government are not
liable for contribution claims concerning the matters directly relating to the
agreement).
14. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (giving "[amny person"
the right to seek contribution from any liable or potentially liable party, as long
as the contribution claim is brought during or after the litigation and the origi-
nal action was brought under sections 106 or 107(a) of CERCLA).
15. See infra notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text.
16. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir. 1994).
17. See United States v. Union Electric, 64 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 1995).
18. Id.
19. 25 F.3d 1174.
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Court of Appeals which supports the position, contrary to
Union Electric, that a party may not use its contribution
claim to intervene in a consent decree. Part IV analyzes both
of these decisions and examines their strengths and weak-
nesses. Furthermore, the probable consequences of each rul-
ing will be brought to light, in conjunction with the
procedural controls that are imposed upon CERCLA actions.
Part V will conclude that the ruling of Union Electric has the
more logical analysis and that the denial of intervention to
non-settling parties is an incorrect interpretation of the pres-
ent law.
II. Background
CERCLA was passed in 1980 when Congress realized
that inactive hazardous waste sites "presented [a] great risk
to the public health and [ I environment [ ] that existing law
did not address .... ,,20 CERCLA was designed to act as a
mechanism whereby hazardous substances could be cleaned
up21 in order to protect the health of individuals and to pro-
tect the environment from the dangers associated with sites
contaminated by hazardous waste.22 The focal point of CER-
CLA and its Amendments 23 is not to regulate the disposal of
hazardous substances. Rather, it is to finance the cleanup of
sites contaminated by hazardous substances. 24
CERCLA has two major purposes. "The primary one is
to enable the federal government to swiftly clean up aban-
doned and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites."25 The "sec-
20. Robert T. Lee, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 225 (Thomas F.P. Sulli-
van ed. 13th ed. 1995).
21. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990).
22. See Gail H. Allyn & Paul W. Pocalyko, Liability for Environmental
Problems Under Federal Statutes, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE HANDBOOK: Li-
ABILITY AND CLAIMS 51, 54.
23. See, e.g., Pub L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100-707,
102 Stat. 4689 (1988); Pub. L. No. 103-429, 108 Stat. 4377 (1994).
24. See Allyn & Pocalyko, supra note 22, at 54.
25. VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND LIT-
IGATION 1 (1992) (citing Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d
1380, 1386 (5th Cir. 1989); Dickerson v. Administrator, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/9
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ondary purpose is to make persons who were responsible for
the improper disposal of hazardous waste bear the cost and
responsibility of cleaning it up."26 To attain these two goals,
Congress has taken steps to ensure that EPA has sufficient
power to act. First, Congress created Superfund 27 an alloca-
tion of billions of dollars for EPA to use in order to investi-
gate, abate, and clean up hazardous waste from hazardous
waste sites. 28 Second, Congress imposed (1) strict and (2)
joint and several liability for those persons who polluted at a
contaminated site.29
A crucial point to note when looking at CERCLA is that
it only deals with hazardous substances. 30 Section 101(14)
provides a list of applicable hazardous substances by refer-
ence to other environmental statutes enacted by Congress. 31
Any substance that appears on this list is a hazardous sub-
stance for purposes of determining whether CERCLA applies
(11th Cir. 1987); J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264
(6th Cir. 1985)).
26. Id. (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247
(6th Cir. 1991)).
27. See Lee, supra note 20, at 267.
28. See CERCLA §111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a).
29. See id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
30. See id. § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a).
31. Id. § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), which defines the term "haz ardous
substance" as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) to
Title 33, (B) any element, compound mixture, solution, or substance
designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous
waste having the characteristics, identified under or listed pursu-
ant to section 3001 of the Solid waste Disposal Act (but not includ-
ing any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous
air pollutant listed under section 1132 of the Clean Air Act, and (F)
any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with re-
spect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to sec-
tion 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum,
including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does
not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas,
or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such
synthetic gas).
5
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to the particular site. 32 As evidenced by the explicit language
of section 101(14), 33 the list is comprehensive and the courts
will not partake in "judicial legislation" in order to determine
whether a substance should have appeared on the list of haz-
ardous substances. 34 However, section 101(14) does provide
that this list may be expanded if another environmental reg-
ulatory statute deems a substance to be a hazardous
substance. 35
After indicating which substances CERCLA applies to,
the statute further explains that Superfund may only be in-
voked when there is a release 36 or threatened release of "haz-
ardous substances" 37 from facilities which dispose of or
contain hazardous substances.38 A determination that CER-
CLA applies in a given situation allows EPA to exercise dif-
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See CERCLA §101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1991) (citing General Elec.
Co. v. Litton Business Systems, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 957-58 (W.D.Mo. 1989)).
35. Id. at 73.
36. "Release" is defined as
"any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, dis-
charging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of bar-
rels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any haz-
ardous substance or pollutant or contaminant, but excludes (A) any
release which results in exposure to persons solely within a work-
place, with respect to a claim which such persons may assert
against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions from the engine
exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline
pumping station engine, (C) release or source, byproduct, or special
nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are de-
fined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq.],
if such release is subject to requirements with respect to financial
protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
under section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 2210], or, for the pur-
poses of section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any
release of source byproduct, or special nuclear material from any
processing site designated under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of
this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer."
CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a definition of "hazardous
substance".
38. See CHARLES M. CHADD, et al., AVOIDING LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS
WASTE: RCRA, CERCLA, AND RELATED CORPORATE LAW ISSUES A-27 (citing
CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/9
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ferent options. Initially, EPA may negotiate with those
parties responsible for the release of the hazardous sub-
stances in an attempt to get the site cleaned by the polluters,
thereby avoiding the expenditure of money from Superfund. 39
Alternately, EPA is empowered to use money from Superfund
to enter a waste site and perform a cleanup operation to re-
move all hazardous waste. 40 If this occurs, EPA is authorized
to bring a recovery action against the suspected polluter to
recoup the entire amount the government expended on the
cleanup operation. 41
The EPA must first make a determination as to (1) who it
will negotiate with to get the site cleaned without expending
federal funds, or (2) who it will pursue to get reimbursed for
the use of Superfund monies.42 CERCLA identifies those in-
dividuals or entities, collectively referred to as "Potentially
Responsible Parties" (PRPs),43 who fall into either of the
above categories. To be classified as a PRP, an individual or
entity must be the:
1) current owners and operators of facilities from which a
release occurs (including, in the case of abandonment, the
owner and operator immediately prior to abandonment);
2) past owners and operators of such facilities at the time
of the disposal;
3) persons who arranged for disposal, treatment, or trans-
port of wastes (including waste generators) at the facility;
4) persons who accepted hazardous substances for trans-
port to a disposal or treatment facility selected by them. 44
When the government demonstrates a nexus between a
PRP and a hazardous waste site, CERCLA holds that PRP
liable under a theory of (1) strict and (2) joint and several
liability.45 These elements become very important during the
39. See CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
40. See id.
41. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
42. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
43. See Lee, supra note 20, at 274.
44. Chadd, supra note 38, at A-27 (citing CERCLA § 106(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)(1)-(4)).
45. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
19971 739
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course of negotiations or litigation because the PRP is being
confronted with liability for the entire cleanup cost of a haz-
ardous waste site.46
If the PRP does not clean up the site using its own
money, or if the PRP cannot be located, and Superfund money
is used to clean up a hazardous waste site, EPA "may negoti-
ate and settle with whichever PRPs it chooses," so long as
EPA does so in good faith.47 The EPA may also settle with
any PRP whose contribution of hazardous substances to the
site was minor, and had minimal involvement with the dispo-
sal site.48
When EPA negotiates a settlement with a PRP, that set-
tlement takes the form of a consent decree between the gov-
ernment and the specific PRP. 49 A consent decree is an
agreement negotiated between the PRPs and EPA and en-
tered in a federal district court as a "judgment entered by
consent of the parties whereby the defendant agrees to stop
alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or wrongdo-
ing."50 As long as the consent decree conforms to specific re-
quirements dictated by federal statute,51 it becomes a tool
that effectively brings an end to the dispute before litigation
becomes necessary. Those PRPs who choose to enter into a
46. There are, however, four (4) exceptions to this statutory rule: (1) an act
of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an
employee or agent of the defendant, under certain circumstances; or (4) any
combination of the first three. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). An
"act of God" is defined as "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other nat-
ural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the
effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of care
of foresight." Id. § 101(1), 42 U.S.C. 9601(1).
47. See FOGLEMAN, supra note 25, at 107 (citing United States v. Cannons
Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 93 (1st Cir. 1990)).
48. CERCLA § 122(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (allowing for expedited final
settlement with PRPs by allowing a final settlement with those PRPs who sat-
isfy all of the criteria under subparagraphs (A) and (B). This section could re-
lease the de minimis PRPs from all liability with the United States and claims
for contribution from other PRPs).
49. See FOGLEMAN, supra note 25, at 109.
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 410 (6th ed. 1991).
51. See, e.g., SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (requiring
that no stipulated penalties be more than $25,000 a day for a violation of the
decree; requiring that all consent decrees go before the Attorney General for
approval).
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consent decree with the government are referred to as set-
tling PRPs.
If a PRP chooses not to settle with the government (a
non-settling PRP) and is found to be liable under CERCLA,
that PRP is statutorily allowed to bring a contribution
claim 52 against all other responsible parties to recoup money
paid to the government for the reimbursement of
Superfund. 53 However, a standard practice in consent de-
crees is the protection from a contribution claim brought by
non-settling PRPs.5 4 This offers the PRP an incentive to set-
tle by: (1) minimizing the PRP's liability; (2) limiting the
PRP's potential exposure for the cost of the Superfund clean-
up operation; and (3) offering an avenue whereby a non-set-
tling PRP is prevented from seeking a contribution claim
against the settling PRP. This protection is valid against all
individuals and entities, regardless of whether they have
been designated as PRPs by EPA, if the consent decree is
properly entered in a United States district court. 55
The question that arises is whether a non-settling PRP
interested in protecting the statutorily granted right of con-
tribution can intervene5 6 before the consent decree is entered
in the federal district court. Section 113(i) of CERCLA57 and
52. A contribution claim is a right of a tort-feasor to recover a proportionate
share of judgment rendered against him/her from other tort-feasors who are
liable. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1991).
53. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); See supra note 14.
54. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2); See supra note 13.
55. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (stating that a person
who has "resolved its liability to the United States or a State" cannot be sued by
other PRPs for contribution).
56. Intervention is defined as "the procedure by which a third person, not
originally a party to the suit, but claiming an interest in the subject matter,
comes into the case, in order to protect his/her right or interpose his claim."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 820 (6th ed. 1991).
57. CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i). This section states that:
[iun any action commenced under this chapter... in a court of the
United States, any person may intervene as a matter of right when
such person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practi-
cal matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect that in-
terest, unless the President or the State shows that the person's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Id.
1997] 741
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Rule 24(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP)58 provide authority for a non-settling PRP to file a
motion to intervene in a consent decree.
With regard to intervention in consent decrees, both sec-
tion 113(i) of CERCLA and FRCP 24(a)(4) are applied in ac-
cordance with the same principles. 59 Courts apply a four-step
analysis to determine whether intervention should be al-
lowed: (1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2)
the applicant must have an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the appli-
cant must be so situated that the disposition of the action
may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest must be
inadequately represented by the existing parties to the suit.60
Under both section 113(i) and FRCP 24(a)(4), the party
seeking to intervene must have a protectable interest under
step two of the above analysis before intervention will be al-
lowed. With regard to CERCLA and non-settling PRPs,
courts throughout the country are grappling with the issue of
whether a contribution claim by a non-settling PRP is a pro-
tectable interest, thereby allowing the non-settling PRP to in-
tervene in a consent decree negotiated with a settling PRP.61
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue,
courts of appeals and district courts have actively addressed
the issue.62 However, in various jurisdictions the reasoning
is different, the analysis is different, and the outcomes are
diametrically opposed to one another. One line of cases, rep-
58. Fed R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), which states that:
[ulpon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicants's ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately repre-
sented by existing parties.
59. See 64 F.3d at 1157-58 (holding that the only difference between FRCP
24 (a)(2) and § 9613 of CERCLA is in who bears the burden of proof as to the
fourth prong).
60. See supra notes 57 & 58.
61. See infra notes 63 & 65 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., infra note 203.
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resented by United States v. Union Electric Co.,63 holds that
the statutorily granted right of contribution is a legally pro-
tectable interest that supports intervention. 64 The alternate
line of cases follows United States v. Alcan Aluminum Inc. ,65
which supports the proposition that a contribution claim
under CERCLA is not a legally protectable interest, and
therefore, intervention should not be allowed. 66
III. - United States v. Union Electric Laboratories,
Inc.67
A. Facts
United States v. Union Electric Co.68 is an action involv-
ing an inactive hazardous waste site located at an old electri-
cal repair facility, Missouri Electric Works (MEW), which
was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).69
Although useful in reducing the risk of fire and explosions in
transformers, PCBs are dangerous to people and the environ-
ment due to their extreme toxicity. 70 Prior to the promulga-
tion of regulations dealing with PCBs in the late 1970s, leaks
and spills of PCBs regularly occurred on the MEW site.7 1
In the 1980s, EPA discovered that the Union Electric site
was contaminated with PCBs, 72 and EPA identified over 700
PRPs associated with the site who had "sold used transform-
ers to MEW, junked transformers with MEW, or sent trans-
formers to MEW for repair."73 In order to avoid litigation,
EPA entered into negotiations with the PRPs to try to create
a consent decree. 74 One-hundred and seventy-nine of the
over 700 PRPs wanted to enter into the final consent decree
63. 64 F.3d 1152.
64. See id. at 1170.
65. 25 F.3d 1174.
66. Id.
67. 64 F.3d 1152.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1155.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1152.
72. See 64 F.3d at 1155.
73. Id.
74. See id.
1997]
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negotiated with EPA.75 The non-settling PRPs consisted of
owners of service shops who "sold electrical transformers di-
rectly to MEW for resale, sold transformers to third parties
who resold them to MEW, or sent transformers owned by
others to MEW for repair."76 Also, the non-settling PRPs
claimed to have never sent a transformer to MEW to be
junked or scrapped. 77
The primary reason the non-settling PRPs did not enter
into the consent decree was the allocation formula used to de-
termine liability arrived at during the negotiations.78 The
non-settling PRPs claimed the formula did not accurately re-
flect the "comparative responsibilities of the various PRPs
and did not correlate costs of remedial action with contami-
nates contributed by the parties."79 Basically, the non-set-
tling PRPs believed that the proportion of the clean-up cost
allocated to them was not reflective of their liability.
After negotiations, EPA had the Department of Justice
file suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri against the 179 settling PRPs and filed the proposed
consent decree with the federal district court.80 The consent
decree contained the allocation formula that the non-settling
PRPs found so objectionable. 8' More significantly, the con-
sent decree contained a provision stating that the settling
PRPs would be protected from any claim of contribution from
those PRPs who chose not to enter into this consent decree
and from any other future PRPs.8 2
Two months after EPA filed the consent decree, the non-
settling PRPs moved to intervene claiming their statutorily
granted right to contribution under CERCLA as a legally pro-
tectable interest.83 When the non-settling PRPs moved to in-
75. See id. at 1156.
76. See id. at 1155.
77. See 64 F.3d at 1155.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1156.
81. See id.
82. See 64 F.3d at 1156.
83. See id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/9
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tervene, the District Court had not accepted the settling
parties consent decree. 84
B. The District Court's Decision 85
In a short and analytically incomplete decision, the dis-
trict court denied the non-settling PRPs motion to intervene
and granted EPA's motion for the consent decree to be ac-
cepted by the court.8 6 Regarding the non-settling PRPs' mo-
tion to intervene, the district court found the non-settling
PRPs claimed contribution interest did not satisfy the re-
quirements of the second prong of intervention because it was
(1) not a "significantly protectable interest" and (2) the inter-
est was "too speculative and contingent."8 7
As to the protectable interest claim, the court's decision
focused on the structure of CERCLA and the intent of Con-
gress to allow a consent decree to protect settling PRPs from
claims of contribution brought under section 113(f)(1).88 The
court relied upon the Supreme Court's ruling in K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc. ,89 which held that "when construing the plain
meaning of a statute, a court must read the particular statu-
tory language at issue in light of the language and design of
the statute as a whole." 90 The court viewed the "structure
and goals"91 of CERCLA as (1) promoting early settlement by
giving settling PRPs protection from contribution claims, and
(2) punishing non-settling PRPs by holding them jointly and
severally liable for the remaining amount of money, even if it
is disproportionate to true liability.92 Thus, allowing a non-
settling PRP to use a contribution claim, in support of a mo-
tion to intervene in a consent decree, would frustrate these
goals of CERCLA and, therefore, should not be allowed. 93
84. See id.
85. United States v. Union Electric Co., 863 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1004.
88. See id.
89. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
90. 863 F. Supp at 1005 (quoting K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1004.
93. See id.
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The district court also held that intervention should not
be allowed because of the "speculative nature" of the non-set-
tling PRPs' contribution claims.94 For the contribution claim
to arise, (1) EPA would have to commence litigation against
the non-settling PRPs, (2) a court would have to find the non-
settling PRPs liable for the clean-up costs of the hazardous
waste site, and (3) the non-settling PRPs would have to be
found liable for a portion of the damage larger than their ac-
tual liability.95 The district court found that this created an
interest that was contingent upon factors that might not oc-
cur in the future; as such, the contribution claim could not be
the legally protectable interest required for intervention.
96
The non-settling PRPs appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.97
C. United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Union Electric was a case of first impression for the
Eighth Circuit.98 The non-settling PRPs claimed that their
statutorily granted right of contribution against the settling
PRPs, which would be lost due to the entering of the consent
decree, was a legally protectable interest, and, thus, their mo-
tion to intervene should have been granted. 99 Specifically,
the non-settling PRPs claimed that this interest was neither
speculative nor contingent because it was created by a spe-
cific provision of CERCLA. 10 0
The respondents, EPA and the settling PRPs, argued
that the district court was correct in ruling that the interest
was too speculative and contingent and that to allow non-set-
tling PRPs to bring contribution claims would violate Con-
gress' intent when it passed this section of CERCLA. 10 EPA
and the settling PRPs argued that the legislative intent was
94. See id.
95. See 863 F. Supp. at 1004.
96. See id.
97. 64 F.3d at 1155.
98. See id. at 1156.
99. See id.
100. See id. (referring to CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)).
101. See id. at 1157.
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to allow the non-settling PRPs to take the consequences of
their failure to enter into the consent decree; a complete loss
of their right to seek a claim of contribution. 10 2 Under this
reasoning, there would be no legally protectable interest ad-
vanced by the non-settling PRPs.103
The court of appeals began its analysis by determining
that the similarity of the language of CERCLA section 113(i)
and FRCP 24(a)(2) demonstrates that "the same standards
should be applied to intervention under CERCLA section
113(i) as are applicable to intervention under [FRCP]
24(a)(2)."10 4 The court congratulated the district court for its
correct pronouncement of the four-pronged test in evaluating
whether or not intervention is proper. 0 5 After doing so, the
court of appeals noted the district court's complete and utter
failure to properly apply this test in the Union Electric
case106 and took the appeal on de novo review.'0 7
Following this line of reasoning, the Eighth Circuit went
through the four prongs of the test:
(1) timely application; (2) the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that the dispo-
sition of the action may as a practical matter impair or im-
pede the applicant's ability to protect the interest; and (4)
the applicants interest is [not] adequately represented by
existing parties. ' 0 8
Primarily, the contention between the parties was the appli-
cation of the second prong; namely whether the non-settling
PRPs' contribution right is a legally protectable interest war-
ranting intervention. ' 0 9
102. See 64 F.3d at 1157.
103. See id. at 1156-57.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1158.
106. See id.
107. See FED. R. CIv. P. 24.
108. 64 F.3d at 1159-60.
109. See id. at 1156.
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In applying the second prong, the court defined what in-
terest would be strong enough to support a motion for inter-
vention.110 Since this was a case of first impression for this
circuit, the court looked to other circuits to determine what
would constitute an interest that would support intervention
under CERCLA. 1 1 Specifically, the court looked to decisions
in the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits to resolve the issue
of whether a party seeking to intervene must have an inter-
est that is "direct, substantial, and legally protectable."112
After laying this foundation, the court in Union Electric
stated that the legislative history of Congress is not to be the
first source examined when interpreting a statute."3 Rather,
"[t]he task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a
statute] begins where all such inquires must begin: with the
language of the statute itself."" 4 The Union Electric court
noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that
this plain meaning rule "is the one, cardinal canon before all
others,"" .5 and that "courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there." 1 6 In recognizing the role of the judiciary, the
Union Electric court again followed the Supreme Court in
holding that when the language of a statute is unambiguous
the role of the court is not to interpret the law, but simply to
enforce it."17 Lastly, the court noted that this rule is to gov-
ern "except in the rare case [where] the literal application of a
110. See id. at 1161. See infra note 111.
111. See 64 F.3d at 1161.
112. Id. at 1161 (citing Alameda Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Browner, 9 F.3d
88, 90 (10th Cir. 1993); Panola Land Buying Ass's v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509
(11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279
(5th Cir. 1978)).
113. See id. at 1165.
114. Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984); United States ex rel. Harlan v. Bacon, 21 F.3d 209, 210 (8th Cir.
1994)).
115. Id. (quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253
(1992)).
116. 64 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
at 253).
117. Id. (quoting Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241).
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statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters." 118 Following this line of reasoning,
the Union Electric court dismissed the legislative intent
argument. 119
The court began its interpretation by examining the lan-
guage of section 113(i) of CERCLA.120 The language of the
statute reads that "any person"1 21 may intervene provided
that the dictates of the statute are followed. 122 The court
noted that no restrictions or limitations are placed upon who
may seek to intervene, including non-settling PRPs seeking
to intervene in a consent decree. At this point, the court had
simply recognized that non-settling PRPs fall under the stat-
utory definition of a party who could intervene. The next step
in the court's reasoning was to follow the statutory factors 123
to determine whether non-settling PRPs have the right to in-
tervene.124 The conflict between the circuits, and the focus of
this article, is the second factor: whether there "an interest
relating to the subject of the action."125
In determining that such an interest exists, the court ex-
amined the language of CERCLA section 113(f)(1) 126 which
states:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section [107](a) of
this title, during or following any civil action under section
[1061 of this title or under section [107](a) of this title.
Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this sec-
tion and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be
governed by Federal Law. In resolving contribution
claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court deter-
118. Id. (citing Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
122. See 64 F.3d at 1165.
123. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The court specifically refers
to factors two, three, and four as its three part test. See 64 F.3d at 1166-69.
124. See id. at 1166.
125. Id. (quoting CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i)).
126. See id.
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mines are appropriate. Nothing is this subsection shall di-
minish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section
[106] or section [107] of this title.127
In making its determination about whether intervention
should be allowed, the Union Electric court "found that the
[contribution] interest was statutory and would be extin-
guished if the consent decree was entered, and, therefore was
legally protectable."128 The Union Electric court pointed out
that certain considerations used by other courts in making
their determinations were "inappropriate."129 Specifically,
the court stated that to follow policy considerations and legis-
lative intent over the factors "dictated by [FRCP] 24(a)(2) and
section 113(i) of CERCLA" was clear error. 30 The court held
that "[tihe task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of
[a statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with
the language of the statute itself."' 3 ' In so deciding, The
Union Electric court followed Supreme Court precedent. 13 2
The Eighth Circuit stated that CERCLA's use of the
phrase "any person," in section 113(i), is plain and unambigu-
ous. 3 3 The words "[any person may intervene as a matter of
right"134 means that any person, regardless of the status or
position of that person, is allowed to intervene so long as the
requirements of section 113(i) are met. 13 5
The Union Electric court then looked to the non-settling
PRPs' claimed contribution interest to determine whether it
127. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
128. 64 F.3d at 1167.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id. (holding that when interpreting a statute, the plain meaning of the
words are to be the first place to look for guidance).
132. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992);
United States v. Ron Pair Enters, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984);
United States v. Manthei, 979 F.2d 124, 126 (8th Cir. 1992); United States ex
rel. Harlan v. Bacon, 21 F.3d 209, 210 (8th Cir.1994)).
133. See 64 F.3d at 1165.
134. CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. 9613(i) (emphasis added).
135. See 64 F.3d at 1165.
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could be held to be a legally protectable interest. 136 Looking
at the wording of CERCLA section 113(f)(1), which states,
"[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a) of this
title, during or following any civil action under section [106]
of this title or under section [107(a)]... -137 the court found
that the right to contribution could support a motion to inter-
vene in a consent decree. 138
There are three elements of section 113(f)(1) that the
court implicitly examined in reaching its conclusion that con-
tribution is a legally protectable interest.139 First, the lan-
guage of 113(f)(1) requires that the action be brought under
one of the two sections specifically listed. 140 The action in
Union Electric satisfies this element because it was brought
under section 106 of CERCLA. 1'4 Second, the contribution
section states that "[a]ny person" may seek contribution. 142
The court noted that this element does not require that the
party seeking contribution have already been found liable 143
so long as the PRP has an interest "which is directly related
to the subject matter of the litigation."144 In Union Electric,
the non-settling PRPs satisfy this requirement in that they
were named as PRPs by EPA; thus, they had an interest in
the litigation.' 45 Third, the section requires that the party
seeking contribution do so "during or following any civil ac-
tion" brought. 146 This element is clear. Those who satisfy the
first two requirements may seek contribution while the action
is being litigated or after the closure of the action. This ele-
ment is satisfied in Union Electric because EPA had insti-
136. See id. at 1166.
137. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added).
138. See 64 F.3d at 1170-71.
139. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
140. See id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (stating that contribution may be sought
from any person potentially liable or found liable under section 106 or 107(a) of
CERCLA).
141. See 64 F.3d at 1156.
142. CERCLA § 113 (M(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
143. 64 F.3d at 1163.
144. Id. at 1166.
145. Id.
146. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added).
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tuted a civil action against the settling PRPs under section
106 and section 107 of CERCLA 147
1. Contribution as Being too Speculative or
Contingent
The Eighth Circuit went on to address the district court's
holding that the non-settling PRPs' interest was too specula-
tive or contingent to support a motion for intervention under
CERCLA. 148 The court ruled that the district court's deter-
mination was "wrong in law."1 49 The language "direct, sub-
stantial, and legally protectable" does not exclude an interest
that is contingent upon the outcome of the litigation. 150 "No
finding of liability is required, nor assessment of excessive li-
ability, before the contribution interest arises." 51 The fact
that the right has not vested is not determinative in this con-
text 152 and this contingency does not bar intervention. 153
The Union Electric court specifically noted that when an
individual is named a PRP, liability is of such a nature that it
will serve as a legally protectable interest. 54 The court im-
plicitly found that under CERCLA, when an individual is
found to be a PRP, liability is "sufficiently certain. . . to sup-
port intervention."15 5 Additionally, the court held that the in-
terest in this context was statutorily granted, thereby
precluding any ruling that it was contingent or specula-
tive.156 A person may assert an interest to support interven-
147. 64 F.3d at 1155-56.
148. See id. at 1166-67.
149. Id. at 1167.
150. See id. at 1161, 1162 (reading together the courts statements that (1) an
"intervenor [shall] have an interest that is direct, substantial, and legally pro-
tectable", and (2) that "intervention may be based on an interest that is contin-
gent upon the outcome of the litigation").
151. Id. at 1167.
152. See 64 F.3d at 1167.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. (citing Securities and Exchange Commission v. Flight Trans. Corp.,
699 F.2d 943, 949).
156. See id. (citing Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433).
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tion prior to suffering a harm in order to prevent a harm that
may occur based on the outcome of the litigation.157
In other contexts, the Eighth Circuit has held that the
legally protectable interest asserted by a party to support a
motion to intervene can be contingent upon the outcome of
the case for which intervention is being sought. 158 Addition-
ally, other circuits have held that a contingent interest is suf-
ficient to satisfy the second prong of the test in order to
determine whether intervention should be allowed. 159
This does not mean that any interest asserted would be
acceptable, but that the determination as to 'speculativeness'
should be made on a case-by-case basis. An interest ad-
vanced which had no realistic basis and was only a theoreti-
cal possibility, could be held to be too speculative.160 The
court refused to accept the contention that an interest that
could be speculative would not satisfy the criteria for
intervention. 161
The court of appeals allowed the non-settling PRP to in-
tervene in the submission of the consent decree. 162 Essen-
tially, it reversed the district court's decision and disallowed
the submission of the consent decree with that court. In its
decision the Eighth Circuit distinguished its holding with
that of United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc.,163 which held
that a contribution claim cannot be used as a basis for inter-
vention by a non-settling PRP.164
157. See 64 F.3d at 1162.
158. See id. at 1162 (See Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 967 F.2d 1245, 1248
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub non, Clark v. Jenkins, 503 U.S. 249 (1992);
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.
1984)).
159. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that inter-
venors contractual interest were not too speculative when they were threatened
by a potential bar).
160. See 64 F.3d at 1162 (See City of Cleveland, Ohio v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515,
1517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. 25 F.3d 1174.
164. See id.
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IV. United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc.
Many district courts following the same reasoning used
in Alcan, have concluded that non-settling PRPs may not as-
sert the loss of a contribution claim as an interest to support
intervention. 165 The court in Alcan reasoned a non-settling
PRP's contribution claim "depends on the outcome of some fu-
ture dispute in which the applicant may, or may not, be as-
signed a portion of liability."166 The court opined this was
significantly different than a case where a settled PRP was
seeking to intervene. 167 A settled PRP, the Alcan court con-
cluded, has a protectable interest because liability has al-
ready been determined. 68 Liability may not be known at the
time that intervention is sought, but "the act of settling
transforms a PRP's contribution right from a contingency to a
mature, legally protectable interest." 69
The Alcan court focused on the legislative history of
CERCLA and found that intervention based on a contribution
claim should not be allowed for non-settling PRPs. 170 The
court stated that Congress specifically intended to expose the
non-settling party "to liability for the rest of the cleanup cost
even if that exposure exceeds the amount the [non-settling
PRP's] "actually contributed to causing the damage at the
hazardous waste site."17 The Alcan court believed, like the
district court in Union Electric, that the purpose of CER-
CLA's contribution section was to encourage settlement. For
the Alcan court to rule in a manner that would, or could, in-
terfere with the possibility of settlement would be to contra-
dict legislative intent. 72
As to the contingent or speculative nature of the interest
asserted by the non-settling PRPs, the Alcan court noted that
165. See id.
166. Id. at 1184.
167. See id.
168. See 25 F.3d at 1184.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1185.
171. Id. at 1184 (citing United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp.
1027, 1040 (D.Mass. 1989), affd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990)).
172. See id. at 1185.
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the right of contribution could not be asserted to support a
motion to intervene.173 The court observed that a right to
contribution does not arise for a PRP until after a court finds
that the party is liable and determines the amount of harm
caused by the PRP. 174 The Alcan court held that a PRP who
wants to intervene to protect a statutorily granted right of
intervention must be denied. 175 Due to the contingent and
speculative nature of the interest asserted, the district court
in Union Electric, like the court of appeals in Alcan, rejected
the non-settling PRP's contention that their right of contribu-
tion was sufficient to support a motion to intervene. 176
V. Analysis
Whether a contribution claim is a legally protectable in-
terest and should support a motion for intervention has
ramifications on both the judicial system and society. Partic-
ularly, who is going to pay for the clean up of hazardous
waste sites? The majority view, as the Alcan court stated in
dictum, is that the loss of the right to seek contribution is not
a legally protectable interest and a contribution claim cannot
serve as a basis for intervention. The minority view, which
follows the decision in Union Electric, is that a contribution
claim is a legally protectable interest and can serve to sup-
port a motion for intervention.
The two rationales espoused in Union Electric and Alcan
have little or no common ground. The primary distinction
occurs in the initial interpretation of the legally protectable
interest aspect of the intervention provision of CERCLA.' 77
On the one hand, Union Electric follows the first canon of
statutory construction which states that the language of the
173. See 25 F.3d at 1184.
174. Id. There are too many steps between the actual ability to seek contri-
bution (a trial, a determination of liability, and a failure to accurately propor-
tion the damages between the party) and the present status of the non-settling
PRP (an individual or entity who EPA suspects may have been responsible for a
hazardous waste site).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
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statute is to be followed when it is clear and unambiguous. 78
Section 113(i) of CERCLA states "any person" may intervene
as long as the four requirements of the existence of a legally
protectable interest are met.179 When read in conjunction
with section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, which provides PRPs the
right of contribution, section 113(i) allows intervention be-
cause the legally protectable interest is the statutorily
granted right of contribution. 80 On the other hand, Alcan
firmly supports the proposition that the legislative history is
to control a court's conclusion.' 8 1 According to the court's rul-
ing in Alcan, the statute's language is not applicable even
when it is unambiguous and can be read to mean only one
thing. An examination of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, in
light of other materials 8 2 will illustrate that the Union Elec-
tric court was correct in its interpretation of the rule of law.
The United States Supreme Court has held that when a
statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, there is no rea-
son to look to additional sources to determine the legislative
intent.'8 3 When the meaning of a statute is illustrated by it's
clarity of wording and the language used by the legislature is
unambiguous, the plain meaning must determine the out-
come.' 8 4 It would be inapposite to conclude that environmen-
tal statutes would be exempted from this clear ruling. If this
simple guideline for interpretation is to be followed by courts,
as the Supreme Court dictates that it must be, it becomes
clear that the court's analysis in Union Electric is proper.
The Union Electric court explicitly held that it followed
Supreme Court precedent when it ruled that the legislative
history is not the primary tool to be used when interpreting
the law.' 8 5 Rather, plain meaning of a statute, if clear and
unambiguous, is to control.' 86 This distinction in the rulings
178. See 64 F.3d at 1165.
179. CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
180. See 64 F.3d at 1166.
181. See 25 F.3d at 1181.
182. See supra note 131.
183. See supra note 131.
184. See supra note 131.
185. See 64 F.3d at 1165.
186. See id.
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may appear to be frivolous, but the interpretation of a stat-
ute, and the application of the law according to such interpre-
tations, shapes the creation of the law itself.
CERCLA gives any PRP the right to sue other PRPs for
contribution.1 8 7 It is important to note that within section
113(f)(1) there is no limitation placed on who may seek contri-
bution.'8 8 The Union Electric court soundly concluded the
parties seeking contribution must have some grounds for be-
lieving that they might be liable for the cost of cleaning the
hazardous waste site. The grounds for this belief in Union
Electric, as in Alcan, are that EPA has named those seeking
to intervene as PRPs. Having been named as PRPs, liability
is sufficiently certain to find that their contribution interest
would support a motion to intervene.
Section 113(f)(2) states that PRPs who settle with EPA
are protected from contribution claims.'8 9 Here, the termi-
nology of the statute is unambiguous: "A person who has re-
solved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution. ,,190 The key to this pro-
vision is that the PRP must have resolved its liability accord-
ing to the terms of CERCLA, which dictates that the consent
decree be entered with a federal district court.191 Only upon
acceptance by a federal district court is a PRP's liability re-
solved. It is at this point in the process that the protection
from contribution claims from other PRPs, as is provided for
in 113(f)(2), takes effect. 192
CERCLA permits PRPs to intervene whenever a legally
protectable right might be "impair[ed] or impede[d]" because
of "any action commenced under this chapter .... " 193 When
examining the language of sections 113(f)(1) and (2), that in-
187. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
188. Id. (stating that "[a]ny person" may seek contribution).
189. CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
190. CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613
191. See id. (stating that only those PRPs who have "resolved" their liability
through the administrative or judicial process are eligible for contribution
protection).
192. See id.
193. CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
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tervention must be allowed when a contribution claim is to be
extinguished. Section 113(f)(1) gives PRPs the right to seek
contribution 194 and section 113(f)(2) gives settling PRPs pro-
tection from contribution after the entry of the consent agree-
ment. 195 If section 113(i),196 the intervention provision of
CERCLA, is to have effect, it must be interpreted, as did the
Union Electric court, to mean that intervention is allowed in
order to protect the statutorily granted right of
contribution. 197
Section 113(i) states that intervention is allowed in "any
action." 19 Following the clear language doctrine, as required
by the Supreme Court, "any action" must include an action by
EPA against PRPs. Logically, this must be the case since
under CERCLA no other action would be filed to recover
money for expenditures made out of Superfind. Therefore,
under Alcan, this provision of CERCLA would have no mean-
ing and would be "legislative dictum." To disregard the clear
language would be to ignore the Supreme Court's ruling that
the plain language of a statute shall be the first avenue the
courts pursue when interpreting a statute.19 9 Moreover, it
would ignore the wording of section 113(i).
On the other hand, Alcan held that legislative history is
to be followed when determining whether a claim of contribu-
tion can be used to support intervention. 200 This determina-
tion blatantly ignores the Supreme Court's ruling that the
first canon of construction is to be the unambiguous language
of the statute. The CERCLA provision that allows for contri-
bution, section 113(f)(1), states that "any person" may move
to intervene. 20 ' It would appear that Alcan's judicial con-
struction of the statute, which does not allow "any person" to
intervene, would exclude an individual or entity simply due
to the court's attempt at interpreting the legislative history.
194. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
195. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
196. See CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
197. See 64 F.3d at 1170.
198. CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
199. See Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. at 249.
200. See 25 F.3d at 1181.
201. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
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Since the Alcan court's interpretation of the non-settling par-
ties ability to intervene violates the Supreme Court's rulings
and the statutory language, it's conclusion must fall.
Additionally, the part of the Alcan ruling concerning
non-settling PRP's right to intervene is dicta. 20 2 Although
only dicta, other district court decisions have followed this
language. 203 These decisions, while ignoring the plain mean-
ing of CERCLA, looked toward legislative history and used a
policy argument to make a final determination that non-set-
tling PRPs did not have a legally protectable interest to sup-
port a claim for intervention. 20 4
That aside, the Alcan court did an excellent job of read-
ing the legislative intent from alternate sources. This is the
preferred means when the intent is not clear from the word-
ing of the statute, but it is subject to the legislative posturing
and grandstanding; the very concerns which forced the
Supreme Court to accept the rule that the first canon of con-
struction is the plain meaning rule. The legislative history
approach to statutory construction causes the meaning of a
statute to be subject to alternate views and interpretations.
This is a less reliable means of interpretation than the plain
meaning rule. When the very words of the statute indicates
the meaning of the law and what was intended by the legisla-
ture, there is no need to enter into guesswork and speculation
in gleaning legislative intent.
The social ramifications as to the outcome of this issue
are fairly clear. The Alcan court had the 'environmentally
correct' decision. Following the ruling articulated would be
extremely helpful in furthering the overall goals of CERCLA
and in ensuring that hazardous waste sites are cleaned up
and paid for. If the Alcan ruling were to be followed, PRPs
would be encouraged to settle disputes under a proposed con-
202. See 64 F.3d at 1163.
203. See United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. 603, 607-08 (W.D. Mich.
1993); United States v. Vasi, 22 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 218, 219 (N.D.Ohio
1991); United States v. Beazer East, Inc., 22 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 218, 222-23
(N.D.Ohio 1991); United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573 576-
77 (W.D.Wis. 1990).
204. See 64 F.3d at 1164.
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sent agreement in order to get the contribution protection
from CERCLA. This would lead to more money coming into
the Superfund, less money being spent on litigation, less ad-
ministrative time being spent attempting to prosecute PRPs,
and less judicial resources being spent on the issue of strict
liability. All of which would save time and money, both of
which are in short supply considering the political outlook of
the present Congress on environmental issues.
These social ramifications are both appealing and desira-
ble attributes. As a society which is becoming more and more
environmentally aware, and whose concern for the environ-
ment is growing, the ability to quickly settle disputes and end
litigation is a worthy goal in and of itself. To forbid non-set-
tling PRPs from using a contribution claim as a protected in-
terest for intervention would advance the long term
environmental goals of this country. There would be less liti-
gation, and thus, more resources available to clean-up haz-
ardous waste sites and to investigate/prosecute other PRPs.
Also, the more consent decrees that the government enters
into, the more money that is coming in to repay Superfund for
the expenditures made in cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
However, the problem is that these extremely attractive
benefits have little to do with the underlying legal argument.
Courts are designed to view the facts according to the legal
principles that are laid down by statutes and Supreme Court
rulings. To ignore the dictates of statutes and case prece-
dents would be to undermine the structure of our judicial sys-
tem. Regardless of how attractive the goals and eventual
outcomes of following the Alcan case may be, there exists no
legal grounds to support its acceptance.
Additionally, under the Union Electric holding, there is
no actual loss of benefits. Section 113(f)(2), as illustrated in
Union Electric, offers protection from contribution claims to
any and all PRPs that complete the settlement process. 20 5
This is a specific, statutorily granted protection that cannot
be successfully challenged. This provision offers PRPs the in-
centive to quickly enter into a consent decree. The district
205. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
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courts' limitation of only protecting completed consent de-
crees gives non-settling PRPs an incentive to stay abreast of
negotiations and to be active in all levels of participation.
There are a few practical reasons that illustrate why fol-
lowing the Alcan decision would be inappropriate. The pas-
sage of statutes is part of the political process. Political
realities can have an effect on the courts' interpretation of the
meaning of a statute, which is a practical reason why the
plain meaning rule exists. Two such realities are: (1) the rule
gives legislators the freedom to debate on related topics and
not be overly concerned with a bill's interpretation from what
is debated and (2) it allows politicians (regardless of any per-
sonal feelings of the topic) an opportunity to pass a law that
may not be viewed by the masses as the optimal solution and
at the same time avoid political repercussions.
First, the ability of a legislator to rely on the application
of this canon of construction offers him a means to openly ar-
gue and debate on the floor of the legislature or committee
about related topics or ideas, but to vote on only what is en-
closed in the legislative package. The floor debate may be
useful in gleaning what was in the minds of specific legisla-
tors, but there is no need to dig for an explanation when the
intent is so clearly set out in the statute that it is nearly im-
possible for a legislative officer to miss. Floor debate on a
clear and unambiguous statute offers a convenient means for
a legislator to vote on a bill and not have to take political
responsibility for the consequences. Political repercussions
can be avoided by saying that the court's interpretation is not
what was intended when the vote was taken, and there is a
legislative floor debate transcript to prove it.
Second, the plain meaning rule laid down in Connecticut
National Bank offers legislators of the majority party the
ability to bury the intent of the statute within the wording of
the statute and to let floor debate give illustrations of its
meaning. This would be done for political reasons in order to
gain protection from public backlash. In the event that new
legislation is initially unpopular, there exists a port for the
legislator to take refuge in by claiming that the statute was
1997]
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misinterpreted and that how it is working was not how he
intended.
These two examples are political realities that happen
every day. With this in mind, it becomes more apparent that
when a statute is written in a clear and unambiguous man-
ner, when there can be no real question as to its meaning, it
is essential to follow the specific wording of the statute. This
canon of construction, as the Supreme Court noted in Con-
necticut National Bank, avoids political posturing and lessens
misinterpretation of the statute by the judiciary.
To this point, only the problems with the law as it stands
now have been articulated. Creating a solution, and examin-
ing the effect of that solution on present problems, is infi-
nitely more important. The circuits are split as to whether or
not a statutorily granted right of contribution can serve as a
legally protectable interest, thus, allowing intervention in a
consent decree. Citizens and entities throughout the country
are treated differently based on where their cases are brought
and the jurisdiction in which the consent decree is filed. The
goal is to avoid this schism in the federal court rulings. Since
the Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue, to
give uniformity to the law, the best solution would be for Con-
gress to amend and alter section 113(f)(1) and (2), and 113(i).
Congress has two obvious choices. First, it may state
that non-settling PRPs can intervene in a consent decree
prior to submission to the court. Second, it may declare that
non-settling PRP's right to contribution is not a legally pro-
tectable interest and, thus, intervention cannot be allowed to
protect this interest. A look at the ramifications of codifying
the outcomes of the Union Electric and Alcan cases is neces-
sary to illustrate why a solution is desirable and necessary.
First, either solution would limit the scope of a courts'
inquiry when determining whether intervention should be al-
lowed. If CERCLA were altered to address the right of non-
settling PRPs to use their contribution claim as a legally pro-
tectable interest, the FRCP would not be at issue and the fo-
cus would be purely upon CERCLA. This would limit
confusion in two areas. One area is that the law that controls
the courts' decisions would be easily identifiable. A specific
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CERCLA provision would address the subject of intervention
as it relates to contribution claims by non-settling PRPs, and
the specific handling of the issue by Congress would override
the more general provision of the FRCP. The other area,
which relates to the first, is the confusion about which test to
apply to intervention claims. The tests articulated for the use
of the FRCP and CERCLA are very similar,20 6 but not identi-
cal. 20 7 Action by Congress to address this issue would tell the
federal courts which test to apply when a non-settling PRP
moves to intervene.
Second, an act of Congress that clearly describes the
rights of non-settling PRPs regarding intervention would
eliminate the lack of uniformity between jurisdictions. The
Supreme Court has even acknowledged the need and desire
of uniformity.20 In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, the
Court stated that where there is a real possibility that differ-
ing opinions will result in essentially the same case depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, there is a need for uniformity to
ensure consistent treatment to all those affected by the
law.20 9
In cases with facts similar to Union Electric and Alcan, a
non-settling PRP could be liable for enormous money dam-
ages and have the statutorily granted right of contribution
cut off for failure to join a consent decree. Alternatively, a
court could preserve a non-settling PRP's right to intervene
and ensure that the right of contribution continues to exist.
The outcome of this monetary issue will affect the cleanup
liability of all hazardous waste sites. The ability to intervene
to preserve a contribution claim will affect who pays for
cleanup, the government or the polluters, which directly af-
fects the stated financial goals of CERCLA.
206. See text accompanying note 60.
207. See supra note 59.
208. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
209. See id. at 365.
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VI. Conclusion
The outcomes of the Union Electric and Alcan cases are
diametrically opposed to each other. Union Electric allowed
non-settling PRPs to establish a viable contribution claim for
intervention by refusing to look beyond the plain meaning of
the statute. This is contrasted by Alcan which would have
refused to allow non-settling PRPs to use a contribution claim
for intervention. This result was reached by specifically ig-
noring the plain meaning of the statute and looking at legis-
lative history. Of these two decisions it is clear that the
holding in Union Electric is judicially correct in its
interpretation.
The court in Alcan cannot be criticized for the rationale
employed in its opinion, nor can any of the district courts that
followed its reasoning. The Alcan court was concerned with
the effect that their interpretation would have on the envi-
ronment, which is reflective of the growing social awareness
of environmental issues. The essential point is that the ra-
tionale used by courts to decide whether a contribution claim
is a protectable interest to support a motion for intervention
must conform to the specific rules and requirements of the
judicial system. Alcan's failure to do so makes its decision
unstable and unsupported.
The central key to resolving this issue is to have Con-
gress amend the CERCLA statute in order to clarify the is-
sue. The split in the courts over the intervention issue is a
reflection of the complexity of CERCLA and the inherent dif-
ficulty in interpreting this legislation. Either the courts are
going to have to follow the holding from the Union Electric
case and allow intervention by non-settling PRPs, which
could hinder the stated goals of CERCLA, or Congress should
act and clearly establish that contribution claims can not be
used as a legally protectable interest to support a motion for
intervention. The problem does not lie with any part of the
judiciary. Rather, the problem lies with Congress' failure to
fulfill its role of creating a workable statute. This issue will
not be resolved until the Supreme Court orders the circuits to
follow a specific interpretation of this CERCLA provision or
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Congress amends CERCLA so it might operate in a workable
fashion.
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